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About the Project 
D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarization in Europe and beyond. 
It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, 
particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises 
this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization) with the 
goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our 
intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of 
being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and 
political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity 
formulations.  
D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans 
national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, 
Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and 
several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political 
science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. 
Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic 
workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous 
foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-
radicalisation. 
With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several 
minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative 
analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The 
process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in 
uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad 
accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances 
that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The 
participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to 




The report provides an insight into the most important hotspots of radicalisation in 
Hungary: the 2008-2009 Roma Murders, the “migrant-hunting” of László Toroczkai 
and the assaults on LGBTQI people orchestrated by György Budaházy. It outlines the 
underlying mechanisms and facilitating conditions of the hotspots, and situates them 
on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum. Our findings show 
that the proliferation of right-wing radical movements, coupled with the wider socio-
political context, has had a significant effect on perpetrators. The growing public 
intolerance towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the dominant political 
discourse, in tandem with the incompetence and/or ignorance of the authorities, are 
likely to have contributed to the outcome. As regards the IGAP spectrum, the feeling 
of grievance, injustice and, paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by 
the perpetrators, but also by a significant proportion of the society at the time of the 
Roma Murders. Similarly, there is a growing consensus among Hungarians that 
migrants and LGBTQI people should have limited access to the resources and 
privileges of the community. Not only the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also 
Toroczkai and Budaházy may have had a reasonable expectation to be appreciated 





This report is part of the Work Package “Trends of Radicalisation” and is based on the 
“Stakeholders of (De-)Radicalisation” report of the D-Rad project. Its objective is to analyse 
the three most important hotspots of radicalisation in Hungary: incidents targeting a) the 
Roma, b) migrants and c) the LGBTQI community. Radicalisation never takes place in a 
vacuum but is always embedded in a certain historical and socio-political context. The report 
will therefore discuss these hotspots in light of the political and cultural factors that have 
structured radicalisation in relation to the above groups in Hungary. Although radicalisation 
does not necessarily entail extremist violence, the report will focus only on its most apparent 
and consequential manifestations. By hotspots we mean repeated (potentially scalable) 
instances of radicalisation that are premeditated and committed by radicalised individuals 
linked to radical movements. More specifically, the report focuses on physical attacks, 
intimidation and violent demonstrations against members of the Roma, migrant and LGBTQI 
communities by right-wing radical groups. Isolated acts of violent extremism committed by 
“lone wolf” perpetrators who neither cooperated with, nor mobilised, trained, influenced by, or 
otherwise linked to, a radicalised group are not considered as hotspots, and as such fall 
outside the scope of the report.  
Following an overview of the chosen hotspots and the method of case selection, the report 
will address the general trends that led to the hotspots respectively. In doing so, it 1) analyses 
the correlation of hotspots with macro, meso, and micro circumstances, 2) outlines the 
facilitating conditions of violent acts and 3) situates these acts on the injustice-grievance-
alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum. Micro level factors consist of the perpetrators’ 
personal circumstances, e.g. employment, identity, integration or other interpersonal issues. 
Meso level factors refer to group level dynamics, such as recruitment, training and networking. 
Finally, macro level factors include the wider socio-political context, i.e. party politics, minority-
majority relations and societal beliefs that account for radicalisation. Distinguished from macro 
level or contextual factors, facilitating conditions are circumstances that make the violent acts 
possible for, or attractive to, the group. These may be access to dark web, transportation, 
weapons, support of political parties, shortcomings of law-enforcement or state complicity. By 
situating the acts in the IGAP spectrum we attempt to scale the level of radicalisation of 
perpetrators in terms of their perception of injustice, grievance, alienation and/or polarization. 
The overall aim of the report is to provide an insight into the root causes of acts pertaining to 
each hotspot at the intersection of the societal, political and group level factors, and also the 
whys, reasons and motivation of individuals within the group.  
   
Hotspots of radicalization  
Overview of chosen hotspots  
As outlined in our previous report on “Stakeholders of (De-)Radicalization” (D3.1 hereinafter) 
one of the most shocking series of events of contemporary Hungarian history were the 2008-
2009 Roma Murders. Four men (Árpád Kiss; István Kiss; Zsolt Pető and István Csontos) killed 
six people leaving many others seriously injured at nine different scenes. The locations were: 
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Galgagyörk (21 July 2008), Piricse (8 August 2008), Nyíradony-Tamásipuszta (5 September 
2008), Tarnabod (29 September 2008), Nagycsécs (3 November 2008), Alsózsolca (15 
December 2008), Tatárszentgyörgy (23 February 2009), Tiszalök (22 April 2009) and Kisléta 
(3 August 2009).1 At most of the scenes the killers set the building on fire by throwing Molotov 
cocktails, while the victims were sleeping, and opened fire at them when escaping. The group 
first killed two people in this way in Nagycsécs. In Tatárszentgyörgy, they shot a father and 
his five-year-old son dead. Although seriously injured, the five-year-old daughter managed to 
run back in the burning house, this is how she survived. The group did not use Molotov 
cocktails in the last two locations. In Tiszalök, where István Csontos first joined the three as a 
driver, they shot a man in the chest with a scoped rifle when the victim stepped out from the 
house. In Kisléta, they kicked the door in and opened fire with a shotgun at a mother and 
daughter lying in bed, killing the mother and causing lifelong injuries to the daughter. Further 
planned attacks at another four locations were prevented by their arrest on 21 August 2009.  
 
The second hotspot is the “migrant-hunting” organized and coordinated by the mayor of 
Ásotthalom, key figure of the Hungarian far right, László Toroczkai. The mayor essentially 
established a civil militia to track down and capture irregular migrants in the vicinity of the 
village and push them back to the other side of the fence. Migrants were being photographed 
on their knees or lying on the ground, face down, with hands tied behind their back. The mayor 
regularly posts photos and videos about the activity of the group on his Facebook page and 
on YouTube channel followed and liked by thousands (see e.g. Observers 2016). 
The third identified hotspot are the incidents against the LGBTQI community led by György 
Budaházy, another notorious figure of the far-right in Hungary. Budaházy and his followers 
have frequently disrupted the Budapest Pride and abused (verbally and physically) the 
participants. In summer 2008, a gay bar and a gay sauna were hit by a Molotov cocktail. Prior 
to the attack, the perpetrators phoned the sauna to make sure there were people inside at the 
time they set the building on fire. There were no serious injuries only because the members 
of staff managed to put out the fire and/or handled the situation effectively. Although no 
organization claimed the attacks, they were attributed to Hunnia, a far-right movement 
established by Budaházy and Toroczkai to carry out armed attacks against members of the 
Gyurcsány government (Háttér 2009). Most recently, in 2019, a group led by Budaházy 
disrupted an LGBTQI awareness event in Auróra in the presence of the police (444 2019a). 
 
Method and reasons for choice of hotspots 
In order to qualify as a hotspot, events must be (1) premeditated and (2) potentially scalable 
acts of (3) extremist violence within (4) a larger series or pattern of similar acts that are 
committed by radicalized individuals (5) clearly linked to or influenced by a radicalized group, 
network or organization.  
Concerning the Roma Murders, criteria (1) and (4) are fulfilled by the very nature of the crime. 
Scalability (2) refers to whether there is data available to assess the motives of the 
perpetrators in terms of the IGAP spectrum. Although the group members did not, or only 
 




partly confessed to the acts, the investigation established the racist motive of the attacks (3) 
based on witness testimonies and further evidence, such as social media posts of the 
perpetrators. When quantifying motivational factors I therefore relied on Arpád Kiss’ 
confession in conjunction with other court hearing evidence and interviews with Kiss (2). Two 
members of the group openly embraced far-right extremist views and were directly linked to a 
radicalised group (5). The investigation also established that the attacks were heavily 
influenced by the Jobbik’s “Gypsy crime” agenda (see D3.1). Three of the villages, 
Galgagyörk, Tatárszentgyörgy and Tiszalök specifically came to group’s attention because 
the Hungarian Guard (see D3.1) previously turned up at these locations due to the tension 
between the Roma and non-Roma population. The group found the marches of the Guard 
insufficient to address the “problem” and therefore decided to handle it in their own way.  
 
The second hotspot, Toroczkai’s “migrant-hunting” is organized (1) by the mayor himself who 
has been justifying the activity with xenophobic and white supremist commentaries on Youtube 
(3). It has been an ongoing activity since 2014 (4) (Alfahír 2014). As already mentioned in 
D3.1 report, Toroczkai is a prominent figure of the Hungarian far-right and has established a 
number of radicalized groups (5). The acts are scalable (2) because the mayor frequently 
reflects and comments on his “war” in the vicinity of Ásotthalom. On the face of it, Toroczkai’s 
militia is perfectly legal. The Hungarian legal framework provides for local governments to 
establish a body of “field rangers” (mezőőr) to protect the farmers in the vicinity of the 
village/town from e.g. crop theft. I will come back to discuss the significance of this facilitating 
condition in section 2.4 of the report. Thus, perhaps it is not accidental that Toroczkai tried to 
distance himself from Betyársereg (see D3.1.) when members of the Sereg turned up in 
Ásotthalom to beat up migrants in July 2015 (Index 2015). There was another initiative from 
right-wing circles (individuals affiliated to Jobbik and the New Hungarian Guard) to organise 
civil militia against irregular migrants at that time (HVG 2015). However, the Police launched 
investigation against the group precisely due to its civil nature (444 2015).    
 
The third chosen hotspots are the incidents against the LGBTQI community. Ever since there 
has been Pride in Budapest, the far-right (3) has turned up and protested against it (1)(4). Not 
only the Pride, but lately, essentially any LGBTQI event in Hungary is at risk of disruption by 
radicalized groups. One of the most vehement and notorious opponents of the LGBTQI 
community in Hungary is György Budaházy. Budaházy and his group sabotaged LGBTQI 
events on several occasions in the past years (Mérce 2019). According to Budaházy, the Pride 
is a “weapon” of a “militant liberalism” to destroy traditional values and is used like a “pair of 
scissors” to “shred the fabric of the society” (2) (Budaházy 2018, 11:54). As already 
mentioned, Budaházy is co-founder of Hunnia Movement, but also further radical movements 
(5), such as the “Arrows of Hungarians” (Magyarok Nyilai) or the Hungarian Revisionist 
Movement (Magyar Revíziós Mozgalom). Budaházy was convicted for 13 years in prison in 
2016 for the 2007-2009 Molotov-cocktail and other attacks against members of the Gyurcsány 
cabinet and the gay bar and sauna. The appeal court, however, annulled the first instance 
court’s decision in 2018 (444 2018). Shorty thereafter, in September 2019, Budaházy, leading 
about 15 fellow radicals, dressed mainly in black and chanting anti-gay slogans, disrupted a 
private LGBTQI event in the community centre in Budapest called Auróra. The group stayed 
in Auróra for about three hours essentially sabotaging the event, while the police arriving at 
10 
 
the scene refused to step up against the intimidation and escort the group out (Magyar 
Narancs 2020).     
 
It is not self-evident and one might wonder why anti-Semitic incidents are not included in the 
hotspots. As discussed in D3.1, according to an anti-Semitic hate crime monitoring group, the 
average annual number of incidents was 39 in the past seven years. The incidents consisted 
of hate speech, vandalism, threats and assaults against Jews. The majority of the cases were, 
however, committed spontaneously. The latest organised incident targeting Jews, attributable 
to a right-wing group, was the raid of Auróra in October 2019. Several dozens of members of 
Légió Hungária (Legion Hungary) raided Auróra, which was closed at the time, and put Neo-
Nazi sticker all over the place. They also removed a rainbow flag from the entrance and set it 
on fire (see D3.1). The group was marching in the city (with members of HVIM and Betyár 
Sereg) before and after vandalizing the building and disrupted a Jobbik event later on in the 
evening (444 2019b), hence the attack against Auróra might have as well been a spontaneous 
act. The police arrested nine members of the group, who were later charged with vandalism 
(but no hate crime) (Népszava 2019). There is, however, no information about the details or 
the outcome of the investigation; the available data is insufficient to scale the motivational 
factors on the IGAP spectrum.  
Micro, meso and macro factors  
Micro 
 
Two among the perpetrators of the Roma Murders were brothers. Árpád Kiss was 42 and 
István was 33 years old at the time of the murders. As a child, when their father died and their 
mother remarried, István’s school achievement was declining and he completed his 
elementary education as a young adult (Magyar Narancs 2011). He worked as a chef but was 
unemployed for years. When Árpád finished high school, he was a drummer in various rock 
groups, then worked in Israel for three years. In 2008, he worked as an audio engineer in a 
club (Perényi 1) in Debrecen2.  Unlike his younger brother, Árpád had no affiliation to neo-
Nazi circles. István was member of the Debrecen skinhead group, “Véres Kard” (Bloody 
Sword). His tattoos included a portrayal of Rudolf Hess, the German imperial eagle, a skull 
and a swastika (ATV 2011). He frequently visited the infamous Loki Klub, the haunt of local 
skinheads; this is where he met Zsolt Pető (34). Pető’s parents divorced and later worked as 
a confectioner and (fighting) dog breeder (Magyar Narancs 2011). Together with István, he 
was member of “Véres Kard” and had an “88” tattoo on his nape, which stands for “HH” i.e. 
“Heil Hitler”. The two used to go to gym together. Pető was interested in firearms, and as a 
security guard in Perény-1 club, he obtained a licence for handguns (HírTV 2013). He was 
previously convicted for vandalism. The fourth perpetrator, István Csontos’ (27) parents also 
divorced when he was a child. He worked as a tiler and was a former soldier deployed in 
Kosovo as a member of KFOR; he was later found unfit for service and dismissed for unknown 
psychological reasons. From 2008, he lived on unemployment benefits. Csontos met Kiss and 
Pető in Loki (Magyar Narancs 2011).  
 




Toroczkai was born in Szeged, the third largest city in Hungary, located near the Serbian 
border. He went to the local, long-standing, Catholic boarding school, then studied 
communication at the University of Szeged (Wikipédia 2021a). His birth name was “Tóth”, 
which he changed when started working as a journalist for Magyar Fórum, the journal of MIÉP 
(Kuruc.info 2013). Between 2003 and 2013, he was the editor-in-chief of Magyar Jelen 
(Hungarian Present), a right-wing radical magazine; the online edition was launched in August 
2020. The name “Toroczkai” comes from the name of Torockó (Rimetea), a village in 
Transylvania, from where Toroczkai’s ancestors on his mother’s side were forcibly expelled 
by the Romanian authorities; his father’s ancestors were forcibly expelled from Zombor 
(Sombor) and Hódság (Odžaci) by the Serbian for that matter. His paternal grandfather, who 
had a significant influence on him, was a gendarme during the Horthy-era and fought in WWII 
for the recapture of Transylvania and the Southern territories (Index 2007; Wikipédia 2021a). 
As mentioned in D3.1, Toroczkai was the founder of HVIM (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági 
Mozgalom – Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement). HVIM’s central objective has been the 
pursuit of irredentist and revisionist sentiments of the Horthy-era. The group has held several 
protests and events in the neighbouring countries demanding autonomy for the former 
Hungarian territories, including Transylvania; Toroczkai was banned from Serbia, Romania, 
Slovakia. He started his political career in MIÉP in 1996 (his father was the leader of the party 
in Szeged) and later was Gábor Vona’s vice-president in Jobbik. Most recently, following the 
internal crisis of Jobbik, he established the party Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) with Dóra Dúró, 
former Jobbik MP. He has been married (divorced in 2017) and is father of three. He has been 
the mayor of Ásotthalom since 2013. 
 
Budaházy was born and raised in Budapest. He holds a university degree in engineering but 
has never worked as an engineer; prior to engaging in radical political activism, he was a 
restaurant owner. According to his Wikipedia page, Budaházy comes from a noble family 
dating back to the 13th century. One of his ancestors participated in the Siege of Eger in 1552 
as a defender and was mentioned by name in Géza Gárdonyi’s novel, the Eclipse of the 
Crescent Moon (Wikipédia 2021b). Among his ancestors there was a Kuruc3 cavalry officer, 
but also member of the “Ragged Guards” (Rongyos Gárda), a non-regular, paramilitary 
revisionist unit in the interwar period. His uncle fought against the Soviets during the 1956 
Revolution. In tandem with Toroczkai, Budaházy is known as a key figure in the 2006 riots and 
the siege of the Hungarian Television. At that time, the rioters were compared to 1956 freedom 
fighters in right wing circles. György Gyula Zagyva, then co-leader of HVIM (see D3.1), 
described the siege in a recent interview as “a crucial moment in the identity formation of 
national-radicals, when they had the opportunity to experience how it felt like to fight in a 
medieval battle or to be a 1956 freedom fighter”(Partizán 2021, 15:16). In reflecting the events, 
Budaházy himself described his own role as a “military leader” who was the “heart” (motorja) 
of the “patriotic resistance” against the “Gyurcsány regime” (Pestisrácok 2018). In the same 
article he claimed that one has nothing to do in national-radical circles unless “wholeheartedly 
identifies with 2006 together with 1956”. Budaházy is married and father of three. He has had 
his own programme on Szent Korona Rádió (Holy Crown Radio), a right-wing radical radio 
channel, and also runs a YouTube channel. 
 




As mentioned in D3.1, right-wing parties and movements were not unique in the Hungarian 
political spectrum in the past 20 years. However, partly due to the deradicalization of Jobbik, 
Hungary has witnessed the proliferation of right-wing radical movements in the recent years 
(cf. Juhász, Hunyadi, Galgóczi, Róna, Szicherle and Zgut, 2017). Besides HVIM, Betyársereg 
and Mi Hazánk, the following notable movements have emerged: 2018 – Légió Hungária 
(Hungarian Legion); 2017 - Erő és Elszántság (Force and Determination); 2017 - Rend és 
Igazságosság (Order and Justice); 2015/2016 - Identitárius Egyetemisták Szövetsége 
(Association of Identitarian University Students); 2014 – Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom 
(Hungarian Self-defence Movement); 2014 – Identitás Generáció (Identity Generation); 2014 
- Hozz Világra Még Egy Magyart Mozgalom (Bring Another Hungarian into the World 
Movement). The leadership and/or platform of these movement more or less overlap, 
embracing ethnonationalist, anti-Roma, anti-Semitic, anti-gay and anti-immigrant sentiments. 
They often jointly participate in, or organise, demonstrations, commemorations and other right-
wing events. However, and most importantly, Fidesz has gradually taken the wind out of their 
sail, and, by now, there is not much left for right-wing radicals in Hungary other than to praise 
government policy (Budaházy 2021). Right wing radicalism can no longer be defined as a sub-
culture, in the strict sense of the term, but it has become a mainstream, if not the most popular, 
political movement in Hungary. As argued in D3.1, Fidesz has successfully closed the political 
space and monopolised right-wing radicalisation in the country, both in terms of political 
discourse and social policy, which seemingly appeals to the majority of the voters. Moreover, 
because of the success story of Hungarian right-wing extremism, coupled with the friendly 
socio-political environment, prominent international figures of the far-right chose Hungary as 
their base, such as Daniel Friberg and John Morgan (founders of Arktos Media), the blogger 
Matt Forney, Michael Polignano (Co-founder of Counter-Currents Publishing), Paul Ramsey 
(Ramzpaul), Erik Almqvist (former member of Swedish Democrats), the Swedish-German 
businessman Patrik Brinkmann, the Holocaust denier Gerd Honsik and the German Mario 
Rönsch (Magyar Narancs 2017; cf. Juhász et al. 2017). 
 
Macro 
As mentioned in D3.1, public attitudes towards Roma had already been aversive and hostile 
in Hungary before Jobbik launched its campaign on “Gypsy crime” linking it with the growing 
anti-establishment sentiments in the country. The Roma is the most rejected ethnic minority 
group; the vast majority of the non-Roma population would avoid social interaction with them. 
Roma people are not only stigmatised and discriminated against but are often highly 
segregated and live in the periphery of the society both in social and spatial terms (Kállai, 
Papp and Vízi 2017; Váradi 2014; Gimes, Juhász, Kiss, Krekó and Somogyi 2008). Attitudes 
of police towards Roma are no less discriminative; overt institutional racism is an ever-present 
reality in Hungary. Ethnic profiling of the Roma, their discrimination and ill-treatment in the 
criminal justice system is well-documented (Pap 2007; Héra 2017). The majority of 
respondents in a study conducted in 1996, with the participation of 1530 police officers, agreed 
that there is a correlative relationship between deviance and criminality, and Roma ethnic 
minority (Székelyi et al. 2001). The participants attributed personality traits such as 
“uninhibited”, “aggressive”, “no respect for property”, “rude”, “noisy”, “lazy” and “lack of respect 
towards law” to Roma. More significantly, the vast majority of respondents felt that there was 
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a strong public need for “severe and harsh” treatment of the Roma, thereby justifying 
excessive force against them. This result was corroborated by a later survey, according to 
which the majority of the Hungarian population agreed that the police should stop and search 
individuals who look Roma because they are “suspicious” (Pap 2007; cf. Miller et al. 2007). 
The results of a 2011 study showed that, according to the majority of law student and police 
officer candidate participants at National University of Public Service, Roma pose a threat to 
society; 41 percent of the latter found Roma “exceptionally dangerous” (Fleck et al. 2012, p. 
57). Concerning questions as to which social groups should enjoy the protection of the state 
and have access to social and economic benefits, such as job-, housing market, education, 
healthcare, most of the respondents gave discriminatory responses in relation to the Roma. 
The answers followed similar patterns in terms of personal interaction with members of the 
Roma community. The vast majority of respondents would not have given consent for their 
children to make friends with children of Roma, nor for their family members to be in a 
relationship with individuals from the Roma community. Police officer candidates, in tandem 
with law students, view society in a hierarchical structure with the Roma at the bottom and 
predominantly displayed xenophobic attitudes towards them (Fleck et al. 2012. pp. 48-90). 
More recently, Boda and Medve-Bálint found that the majority of the Hungarian majority 
population does not seem to be concerned with the discrimination of the Roma, even though 
they acknowledge their unfair treatment by the police (Boda and Medve-Bálint, 2017). That is, 
the situation of the Hungarian Roma can be, more or less accurately, sum up as follows: on 
the one hand, the majority of the public are likely to consent to the harsh treatment of Roma 
in Hungary, and the police tend to shift responsibility and justify discriminatory practices by 
public pressure, on the other. 
 
As already discussed in D3.1, the attitudes towards migrants are no less aversive in Hungary; 
thanks to the permanent and overwhelming anti-immigrant campaign of the Fidesz-KDNP 
government. The government depicted irregular migrants as Muslim “invaders” whose 
purpose is Islamisation and the destruction of Western civilisation. The campaign has used 
public media outlets, pro-government media, billboards, propaganda events nationwide by 
government appointed national security experts and the so-called “national consultations” 
(D3.1.). Orbán maintained that Hungarians wish to preserve the “ethnic homogeneity” of the 
nation and migration only represents a threat to the Hungarian “way of life”. In tandem with 
the campaign, the government dismantled the entire asylum system with repeated 
amendments to the Asylum Act and related legislations (Gyollai, 2018). As a result of these 
developments, the level of xenophobia and rejection of migration among the Hungarians 
peaked in the recent years (Simonovits, 2020; Simonovits and Bernát, 2016). 
 
Concerning attitudes towards the LGBTQI community, Hungary is a traditionally homophobic 
society (Takács, 2011), and the figure is not improving. According to the latest Eurobarometer 
survey on the social acceptance of LGBTI people in the EU, Hungary is among the most 
intolerant Member States (European Commission 2019). Only 48% of the Hungarians agree 
that LGBTQI people should have the same rights as heterosexual people, and 41% agree that 
there is nothing wrong in sexual relationship of same sex couples. 33% would allow same sex 
marriages, and 69% and 62% would feel uncomfortable with two men and women kissing or 
holding hands in public respectively. As we elsewhere (Gyollai and Korkut 2020) and in D3.1 
discussed, LGBTQI people have been under attack by the government. Most recently, the 
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parliament has passed yet another amendment to the constitution to further curtail LGBTQI 
rights. According to the new amendment, “the mother is a woman, the father is a man” and 
children shall have the right to be raised “in line with Hungary’s constitutional identity and 
Christian culture”. Ironically, just a few weeks before the amendment, former MEP József 
Szájer, founding member of Fidesz, ended his political career by sliding down a gutter to 
escape Belgian police following a raid on a gay sex orgy. Szájer was personally responsible 
for laying down the constitutional basis of LGBTQ discrimination in Hungary as co-author of 
the new constitution which defines marriage as a relationship between man and woman. 
According to the László Kövér, Speaker of the House (in the parliament), another founding 
member of Fidesz: “A sound homosexual person knows what the world order is; they are 
aware of that they were born or have become one (gay) and try to adapt to the world by not 
necessarily considering themselves to be equal.” As Kövér notes, “in the moral sense there is 
no difference” between paedophilia and gay adoption (cf. Gyollai and Korkut 2020). His view 
is in line with Orbán’s message to the LGBTQI community, who, according to the PM, should 
“leave our children alone” (cf. D3.1). Most recently, the Parliament passed legislation to ban 
LGBTQ content from schools and depiction of homosexuality in media.    
 Facilitating factors  
While we distinguish facilitating factors from macro level factors and define them as 
circumstances that make the violent acts possible or attractive to the perpetrators, certain 
contextual factors may have a facilitating effect. The general level of intolerance towards the 
Roma, migrants and the LGBTQI community in the Hungarian society arguably lowers hate 
speech/crime awareness. At the time of the Roma murders, due to the prevailing public 
atmosphere described above, Csontos’ social media post under the nickname of “Csontrabló” 
(Bone Snatcher) did not blow any fuse: “I say let us, Hungarians, kill the gypsies, women, 
elderly and everyone who protects them” (Magyar Narancs 2009). In fact, witnesses at the 
trial were surprised at the judge’s question whether the accused had made or not derogatory 
comments about Roma: “everyone talked about the Gypsy-question” (LiveInfoHUN 2011a) or 
“everyone hated them (the Roma) in my circle, I don’t understand why this is relevant” (Abcúg 
2014). As the lawyer of the victims noted: “these four person had a real reason to believe, 
based on the feedbacks from their circle, that the whole country holds the same opinion about 
the Roma, and that they would be thanked for their acts” (Ibid). 
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) raised concerns about 
failure of the Hungarian authorities to adequately address hate speech. Derogative remarks 
against the members of the above groups have long become normalised and mainstreamed 
in public discourse. In Hungary, it is a widely acceptable form of expression to chant “mocskos 
buzik!” (filthy faggots) in street demonstrations. The ECRI report warns that when public 
figures affiliated to the governing party can depict the Roma as animals and talk about 
“buzilobbi” (faggot lobby) in theatre art without consequences, it creates and atmosphere of 
impunity in the society (ECRI 2015; cf. D3.1). What since has changed is that now the PM 
himself incite hatred against migrants, warns the LGBTQI community “to leave our children 
alone” and deny financial compensation to segregated Roma children (cf. D3.1).  
When the government’s crusade against mass migration appeals to the vast majority of the 
population, it can no doubt be attractive to right-wing radical politicians to organise their own 
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militia to abuse irregular migrants. Toroczkai has been able to do so essentially with no legal 
consequences since 2014 due to a unique constellation of factors: a) in his capacity of a mayor 
he can initiate, and the council may arrange for the establishment of ranger service to protect 
the crop fields in the village under Art 16 of Act CLIX of 1997; b) Ásotthalom is right at the 
Serbian-Hungarian border thereby the border region is essentially falls within the jurisdiction 
of the village and hence the rangers; and c) Art 21 of Act CXX of 2012 provides for rangers to 
carry firearms. Although firearms shall be used only against animals, irregular migrants are 
unlikely to be aware of the relevant Hungarian legislation and are likely to be intimidated by 
armed and uniformed men (Alfahír 2014). Accounts of irregular migrants about the 
circumstances of their “arrest” is not known, e.g. whether anyone has ever been held or not at 
gunpoint, and Toroczkai’s men push them back to the other side of the fence. Toroczkai 
promoted (for the public) rubber bullet guns against migrants for that matter (HVG 2015) and 
most recently, because a group of irregular migrants broke in a local cottage for shelter, urged 
the authorities to authorise fire-at-will order to resolve the problem (Toroczkai 2021). While 
woodlands fall outside the jurisdiction of rangers,4 the mayor has recently posted a footage of 
his rangers chasing migrants in the woods at night on his YouTube channel (Toroczkai 2020). 
The person who is recording, perhaps a ranger, shouts at migrants blinded by the torch light: 
“Sit down” and “Shut up!”; the majority of the group is lying on the ground face down. Even 
though one might argue it is a grey legal area (cf. Magyar Ügyvéd 2017), as of now, to my 
knowledge, no criminal investigation has been launched into the activities of Ásotthalom 
rangers. HVG magazine earlier described the authorities’ approach to the “migrant hunt” in 
Ásotthalom: “carry on there is nothing to see here” (HVG 2017). In fact, in November 2016, 
when Gábor Vona temporally joined the rangers for a campaign video, Toroczkai told Vona 
that the Home Office had been financially supporting the border control and other activities of 
the rangers since 2014/2015 (Nemzeti1tv 2016, 01:47).  
 
Perhaps the authorities’ apparent hesitation / incompetence to adequately respond or 
intervene and prevent further acts has arguably played a facilitating role concerning each 
hotspot, or had, at least, very little constraining effect. Concerning the 7th scene of the Roma 
Murders, at Tatárszentgyörgy, the police arrived at the scene after the local TV channel 
followed by the ambulance. The relatives were told that the cause of death, in both cases, was 
suffocation by smothering, only the autopsy revealed the gunshot wounds. The police forensic 
team initially only focused on the interior of the house. They only returned after dawn, when 
someone called in and reported cartridge cases around the house. According to the ERRC, 
NEKI and TASZ (2009) joint report, the caller also showed the police footprints and cigarette 
butts, but one of the officers accused the family of putting the cartridges on the crime scene 
and urinated into a footprint. The police were also told that a birdshot5 was found in the clothes 
of the 5-year-old daughter, which they ignored. The report reviews the procedural failures on 
six pages (ERRC, NEKI and TASZ, 2009; cf. Amnesty, 2010). Not only that, it was later 
revealed that István Csontos was an informant of the Intelligence Services during the murders 
which the Services initially denied. Moreover, István Kiss were under secret surveillance by 
the Services, who knew about Kiss’ attempt to illegally obtain firearms (Nol 2013). Although it 
has never been disclosed what exactly the Services knew about the group, the Minister for 
 
4 See Art 16 of Act CLIX of 1997, Available at: https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99700159.tv.  
5 The smallest shot or pellet size for shotguns. 
16 
 
Intelligence Services later admitted that the Tiszalök, but perhaps also the Kisléta murder 
could have been prevented with better cooperation between the Police and Secret Services 
(Magyar Narancs 2015). Investigation has been launched against four top leaders of the 
Services, all of the cases however ended with acquittal at the court (Index 2016).      
 
In November 2020, the court found that police should have intervened immediately when 
Budaházy’s group disrupted the LGBTQ event in Auróra, regardless of whether the 
intimidation involved physical violence or vandalism. The court argued that the act of 
Budaházy’s groups falls outside the scope of the right to freedom of assembly because it was 
at variance with the principle of tolerance and non-discrimination as well as the right to private 
life (Magyar Narancs 2020). One month before the court decision, in October 2020, the 
LGBTQ community organised a book-reading event to promote the children’s book with 
LGBTQ characters “Wonderland Belongs to Everyone” (see D3.1) with the participation of 
children. The organisers eventually decided to hold the event without audience to avoid putting 
the children at risk, because the Police approved Budaházy’s application to demonstrate at 
the event (HVG 2020). That is, a person with serious criminal record, well-known to the 
authorities, who has been convicted for terrorism (but the second instance court ordered a 
new investigation), can walk in and disrupt LGBTQ events at any time he wishes with total 
impunity; as far as the police concerned, his act does not constitute a homophobic hate crime.  
Motivational factors to be quantified in the IGAP 
questionnaire  
This section summarises the reasons and purposes behind the hotspots as self-reported by 
the actors. The quotations and excerpts below are translated from interviews by media, court 
hearings, social media posts and YouTube videos uploaded by the actors themselves. As we 
shall see, a feeling of injustice and grievance following certain serious crimes committed by 
people with Roma background had a significant motivational effect on the perpetrators of the 
Roma Murders. In conjunction with grievance and injustice, alienation and polarization also 
played a role in the first hotspot. While Zsolt Pető and István Kiss were members of a neo-
Nazi group, the source of Árpád Kiss’ alienation seems to be the hopelessness and frustration 
triggered by the repression of the 2006 riots by the police. Not only did the right wing create a 
revolutionary atmosphere after the crisis of Gyurcsány government, but it also linked anti-
establishment sentiments with pre-existing anti-Roma attitudes (see D3.1). Conversely, 
regarding the second and third hotspots, it is xenophobia and homophobia, and an increasing 
level of polarization against both migrants and the LGBTQI community that have motivated 
Toroczkai and Budaházy respectively, at least as I see it.    
 
As to the first hotspot, the accused denied the racist motive at the trial. In an interview, Zsolt 
Pető said that he was “proud of being Hungarian” and visited right wing events, such as 
Trianon commemorations, but he was not a racist (HírTV 2013). Árpád Kiss also denied that 
he would be racist. On the contrary, he said that he had been trying to influence his brother to 
leave right-wing circles. He admitted that they were present at three of the scenes, but he 
rejected the accusation that their specific purpose was to kill (LiveInfoHUN 2011b). Arpad Kiss’ 
defence lawyer claimed that he meant that the group was only planning to create an ethnic 
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conflict between Roma and non-Roma (Nol 2015). According to the charges, however, the 
Olaszliszka murder (see D3.1) had a major impact on the group; as audience they were 
present at the Hungarian Guard’s founding ceremony but did not think that the Guard was 
sufficient enough to solve the problem (LiveInfoHUN 2011c). Árpád Kiss said that they had no 
interest in joining the Guard, he was, however, “enraged” by the Roma incident in Galgagyörk 
(The Guard assisted a non-Roma family with moving from the village who were previously 
abused by local Roma.):  
 
We have never looked for contact with the Guard. At that time it was a rather strange 
phenomenon. Though the atmosphere was already strange in the country. Lots of heated 
reports were written about what happened before the Galgagyörk case (the murder) projecting 
a civil war. These reports all had an infuriating effect in that heated political atmosphere. So 
this event in Galgagyörk (the non-Roma family being abused) enraged me too, I would not 
deny that…I have been interested in politics since 2006. I participated in demonstrations, even 
if not always actively, but I followed the situation on TV. There was a revolutionary atmosphere 
at that time. These moments were totally uplifting. Its repression (the revolution) however 
resulted in frustration. Probably this entailed being ended up with violence and because of the 
bloody repression of the demonstrations; the situation became even worse after that. Plus the 
very serious murders (Olaszliszka), picked up by the media, infuriated the society and just 
added fuel to the fire. So that year had an atmosphere which made you carried away; at least 
this is how I can explain it. And that at the end there was no solution, but they repressed the 
frustration, and politics came up with new lies in addition to old ones. (Romnet 2011) 
 
The interviewer reminded Arpád Kiss that once he would have to explain to his child why he 
did what he did. His answer was: “Perhaps it is just a hindsight feeling but worrying about his 
future had, in fact, a role in what happened” (Ibid). 
His brother refers to the Gyurcsány government as “communist regime” and claimed that they 
were simply scapegoated for their “nationalist mentality” (HírTV 2015). István Kiss was less 
than 14 when older Roma teenagers picked a fight with him, beat him up and took his cassette 
player (LiveInfoHUN 2011c). About his radicalisation he said:  
 
I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat up and rob 
everyone…this is why I became a skinhead when I was 17…we thought that the law and the 
criminal justice system fails to fulfil its purpose and we thought we would regulate 
(“megrendszabályoz”) the Roma. We wanted them to realise that they can be scared in this 
country as well, not just others. We wanted to put fear into the Roma, so that they would know 
how it feels like to be scared of another group, but we didn’t want to kill them. (LivenInofHUN 
2011b)  
 
In 1999 István Kiss nearly died when stabbed in a fight by a person with Roma background 
but he said it had absolutely nothing to do with his radicalisation (HírTV 2015).  
István Csontos claimed at the court:  
 
An 83-years old lady was raped and her leg was chopped off with an axe. Half drunk, this 
upset me. Unfortunately, I couldn’t control myself and left a very ugly post on Internet…they 
(the other three) wanted to expand the crimes, they wanted to create a small 
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army…sometimes they called Hitler “daddy”, they were essentially neo-Nazis. (LiveInfoHUN 
2011d) 
 
As he added in an interview: “I knew that they have had issues with Roma…I am not surprised 
about that though, because this is unfortunately the situation in Hungary”. He said that judging 
people based on their race or the colour of their skin is nothing he would do but he judges 
others based on their acts. However, he said “perhaps it sounds a bit harsh, but as long as 
you only hear that they shot a Roma perhaps you take it differently than when that Roma 
person has a name and personality, then it’s worse” (Edua 2010). 
 
It is difficult to tell how genuine and sincere Toroczkai’s aversion against migrants is. His wife, 
an ethnic Romanian from Moldova, spoke no Hungarian before they met; a contradiction often 
cited in the media. However, the campaign with the rangers seems to be successful; he was 
re-elected as mayor in 2019. To be sure, besides the “migrant-hunting”, Toroczkai also banned 
Muslims and gay people from Ásotthalom (Hungarian Free Press 2016).  
In the campaign video (with English subtitle) mentioned earlier, the mayor explains his 
audience why rangers in Ásotthalom are necessary: 
 
Here at the southern border we have been living for years as if there was a permanent war. In 
2013, I became a mayor to fight this migration, and it wasn’t a question of party politics, but it 
was about protecting our borders because our life depends on it. This is why we established 
the municipal field guard system (sic) in Ásotthalom in 2014, because this border was 
completely open. No one has protected this border since the abolition of the border guard 
system. In 2014 and 2015, hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants marched through here, 
and we defended this border against them only with a few field guard colleagues. From 2015, 
fortunately, the Hungarian police and soldiers have arrived, and the fence was built which has 
had an important function ever since. However, migration is not over. They keep coming, we 
catch larger groups every week and they are still almost exclusively young, military-aged 
male…watch how we, how my colleagues catch these migrants on a regular basis at night in 
the woods, as in this war, there is an extreme need for my colleagues, because they are better 
trackers than the Apache...typically they find themselves overpowered by at least ten times by 
their number, deep in our forests. (Toroczkai 2020) 
 
In the video, one of the rangers talks, sometimes in English but mainly in Hungarian, to two 
young Afghani boys sitting on the ground in the woods. When the ranger asks one of the boys 
in Hungarian, “What do you want in Western Europe?” and the boy, intimidated and terrified, 
whispers the words “problem” and Afghanistan” the rangers responds in English: “You are the 
problem” (Toroczkai 2020, 05:22). Toroczkai later recites the rationales of the government, 
the “war for a multicultural Europe”, migrants coming from a “completely different civilisation”, 
beheadings, rape and so on. He brings historical examples in support of his final argument, 
i.e. “a multicultural, mixed society is actually a dysfunctional utopia”.  
The mayor once posted a photo where migrants walk in a line with their hands on each other’s 
shoulder and with a police officer in the background (ATV 2017, 01:50). His comment under 




As I promised, those whose name will be remembered both in Hungary and Europe as the 
most disgraceful traitors cannot prevent us from arresting the criminals who break in our 
homeland, cottages and homes by destroying the border fence. These men from the Middle-
East, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan are not refugees but criminals. The role of the police 
and rangers are precisely to arrest criminals. Using great force if necessary. These are the 
latest arrestees as a result of the brave joint achievement of the police and the rangers of 
Ásotthalom. We should be grateful and thankful for them, and not reporting them to the police 
like traitors do. These weaklings, reporting migrant supporters should come and join the line, 
they are useless anyway. 
 
Concerning the incidents against the LGBTQ community, as Budaházy and his circle shared 
their thoughts at an event (“Patriots about the Budapest Pride: Abnormality must be stopped”) 
in 2018, the legal system cannot provide sufficient protection against the gay in Hungary 
because they easily circumvent the rules. Budaházy problematises, for example, that even if 
a gay couple together cannot adopt children, there is no restriction for individuals, and then 
they raise up the child together, let alone the child benefit they get (Budaházy 2018, 10:30). 
As one of his fellow anti-gay activists here interrupts: “I don’t want to encourage anyone to 
commit physical violence, but this is outrageous, and perhaps one might say that these people 
only understand a punch” (Budaházy 2018, 10:55).      
According to Budaházy: 
 
There is a liberal or cultural-Marxist group which has been around on the Globe for about 150 
years, constantly evolving, whose obsession is to subvert the traditional, conservative ideals 
in the society. Their mission to turn everything upside down. Once they did this as Bolshevists, 
then, after the French Revolution, as Jacobins, and today we call them Liberals. But this is a 
totally militant Liberalism, and the Pride is its weapon. This is how I look at it, like a scissors 
shredding the yet intact fabric of the society; it cuts into it while they are pushing it forward. It 
is so absurd that, if they managed to reach their goal, it would enable other things to happen. 
The most threatening issue is not that they get certain people involved in that degenerate 
community, of course it is dangerous too…but they can force the public to remain silent and 
scare them away from raising their voice against it. The public will be scared of being labelled, 
because they (the gay) label very aggressively…and then they can do anything they want, not 
only this, but anything, for example they can bring 2 million negros and Arabs to the West, to 
Germany, who beat up the people, rape the women, and the white men are just standing there 
and staring at it, because all has been set, among other things, precisely by this (the Pride). 
(Budaházy 2018)   
 
As the “Patriot” added, there are two different kinds of dangerous people:  
 
First, the organisers of the Pride, and second, those who claim we should just ignore them 
(the gay) because they only ask for recognition…it’s dangerous because what they really want 
is precisely to be ignored so that they can unleash themselves in the society, and then, in their 
own way, with their media, just like in the West, they can reach their goals and get into the 
bloodstream…if we step up against them and keep the cordons (the Pride is usually held 




(Budaházy managed to bridge anti-establishment, anti-gay and anti-immigration arguments, 
all in one breath. The adequate analysis of his motivation perhaps requires an expertise that 
is beyond the competence of the author and the scope of a sociological research. Though it 
is important to note here that the reason why none of the investigations against him resulted 
in his conviction so far had nothing to do with issues of mental impairment.) 
Budaházy welcomed the latest amendment to the Constitution according to which “the mother 
is a woman and the father is a man”. He claimed it is the result and achievement of a long 
fight by the radical right. As he emphasised, according to them, every kind of sexual 
degeneration / aberration result in paedophilia. Gay people now want to break in schools and 
families, and the children’s book “Wonderland Belongs to Everyone” only serves the 
“degenerative brainwashing of children”. (Budaházy 2021)  
Conclusions  
The purpose of this report was to provide an insight into the possible causes of the 2008-2009 
Roma Murders, the “migrant-hunting” of László Toroczkai and the assaults on LGBTQI people 
orchestrated by György Budaházy. The report discussed the events in the context of the 
individual circumstances of the perpetrators and their motives, the meso or group level factors, 
the overall socio-political context at the time of the incidents and the potential facilitating 
conditions. Based on the available information, except the case of István Kiss, it cannot be 
said that there was a cause and affect correlation between the direct personal circumstances 
of the actors and the acts. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see, to what extent both 
Budaházy and Toroczkai felt predisposed by their family history to engage in right-wing 
extremism. Conversely, it is perhaps safe to assume that the meso level factors intertwined 
with the socio-political context have had a direct effect on the actors with respect to each 
hotspot. The supportive, if not complicit, social surround, i.e. the level of intolerance in the 
Hungarian society towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the proliferation of far-
right movements, the dominant political discourse in tandem with the incompetence and/or 
ignorance of the authorities have, arguably, significantly contributed to the outcome. In other 
words, public sentiments and political narratives are mutually reinforcing, and that, coupled 
with the attitude of the police as quasi-bystanders, have potentially served as justification, if 
not motivation, for the actors of the hotspots. The feeling of grievance, injustice and, 
paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by the perpetrators of the Roma 
Murders, but also by a significant proportion of the society at that time. Similarly, there is a 
growing consensus among the majority of the Hungarians that migrants and LGBTQI people 
are Others who do not belong to the ingroup and / or should have limited access to its 
resources and privileges. That is, not only the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also 
Toroczkai and Budaházy may have had a reasonable expectation to be appreciated by a 
significant proportion of the public for what they have done. Unlike the former, Toroczkai and 
Budaházy are at large. Not only that, but they have also enjoyed the financial and/or 
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Annex: I-GAP Coding 
Injustice Questionnaire – Arpad Kiss, Istvan Kiss and 
Istvan Csontos 
Q1 












“So this event in Galgagyörk (the non-Roma family being abused) enraged me too, 
I would not deny that.” (Score: 5)   
 
“I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat 
up and rob everyone…this is why I became a skinhead when I was 17…..We wanted 
them to realise that they can be scared in this country as well, not just others. We 
wanted to put fear into the Roma, so that they would know how it feels like to be 
scared of another group, but we didn’t want to kill them.” (S: 5) 
 
“An 83-years old lady was raped and her leg was chopped off with an axe. Half 
drunk, this upset me. Unfortunately, I couldn’t control myself and left a very ugly post 
on Internet” – “I say let us, Hungarians, kill the gypsies, women, elderly and everyone 
who protects them.” (S: 5) 
Q2 To what extent were the actors motivated by a real 
or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads 










“Plus the very serious murders (Olaszliszka), picked up by the media, infuriated the 
society and just added fuel to the fire.” (S:5) 
 
“I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat 
up and rob everyone…this is why I became a skinhead when I was 17…..We wanted 
them to realise that they can be scared in this country as well, not just others.” (S:5) 
 
“I knew that they (his fellow perpetrators) have had issues with Roma…I am not 










No data available. 
Q4 





No data available. 
Q5 















“I participated in demonstrations, even if not always actively, but I followed the 
situation on TV. There was a revolutionary atmosphere at that time. These moments 
were totally uplifting. Its repression (the revolution) however resulted in frustration. 
Probably this entailed being ended up with violence and because of the bloody 
repression of the demonstrations; the situation became even worse after that...So 
that year had an atmosphere which made you carried away; at least this is how I can 
explain it. And that at the end there was no solution, but they repressed the 
frustration, and politics came up with new lies in addition to old ones.” (S: 5) 
 
“…we thought that the law and the criminal justice system fails to fulfil its purpose 
and we thought we would regulate (“megrendszabályoz”) the Roma.” (S: 5) 
Grievance Questionnaire – Arpad Kiss, Istvan Kiss and 
Istvan Csontos 
Q1 








“So this event in Galgagyörk (the non-Roma family being abused) enraged me too, 
I would not deny that.” (S: 5) 
 
“I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat 
up and rob everyone” (István Kiss was less than 14 when older Roma teenagers 






“An 83-years old lady was raped and her leg was chopped off with an axe.” (S:5)  
Q2 



















Though the atmosphere was already strange in the country. Lots of heated reports 
were written about what happened before the Galgagyörk case (the murder) 
projecting a civil war. These reports all had an infuriating effect in that heated political 
atmosphere. So this event in Galgagyörk (the non-Roma family being abused) 
enraged me too, I would not deny that…I have been interested in politics since 2006. 
I participated in demonstrations, even if not always actively, but I followed the 
situation on TV. There was a revolutionary atmosphere at that time. These moments 
were totally uplifting. Its repression (the revolution) however resulted in frustration. 
Probably this entailed being ended up with violence and because of the bloody 
repression of the demonstrations; the situation became even worse after that. Plus 
the very serious murders (Olaszliszka), picked up by the media, infuriated the society 
and just added fuel to the fire. So that year had an atmosphere which made you 
carried away; at least this is how I can explain it. And that at the end there was no 
solution, but they repressed the frustration, and politics came up with new lies in 
addition to old ones. (S: 5) 
 
“I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat 
up and rob everyone.” (S: 5) 
Q3 








“Perhaps it is just a hindsight feeling but worrying about his future had, in fact, a role 
in what happened.” (S: 3) 
 
István Kiss was less than 14 when older Roma teenagers picked a fight with him, 
beat him up and took his cassette player. (5) 
 
An 83-years old lady was raped and her leg was chopped off with an axe” (1) 
Q4 










“There was a revolutionary atmosphere at that time. These moments were totally 
uplifting. Its repression (the revolution) however resulted in frustration. Probably this 
entailed being ended up with violence and because of the bloody repression of the 
demonstrations; the situation became even worse after that…And that at the end 
there was no solution, but they repressed the frustration, and politics came up with 
new lies in addition to old ones.” (S: 1) 
 
“I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat 






“I say let us, Hungarians, kill the gypsies, women, elderly and everyone who protects 
them.” (S:1) 
Q5 










“The group was only planning to create an ethnic conflict between Roma and non-
Roma.” (S: 3) 
 
“We wanted them to realise that they can be scared in this country as well, not just 
others. We wanted to put fear into the Roma, so that they would know how it feels 
like to be scared of another group, but we didn’t want to kill them.” (S: 5) 
 
“I say let us, Hungarians, kill the gypsies, women, elderly and everyone who protects 
them” (S: 1) 
Alienation Questionnaire – Arpad Kiss, Istvan Kiss and Istvan Csontos 
Q1 










“There was a revolutionary atmosphere at that time. These moments were totally 
uplifting. Its repression (the revolution) however resulted in frustration. Probably this 
entailed being ended up with violence and because of the bloody repression of the 
demonstrations; the situation became even worse after that…And that at the end 
there was no solution, but they repressed the frustration, and politics came up with 
new lies in addition to old ones.” (S: 1) 
 
“I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat 
up and rob everyone…this is why I became a skinhead when I was 17.” (S: 5) 
Q2 









“There was a revolutionary atmosphere at that time. These moments were totally 
uplifting. Its repression (the revolution) however resulted in frustration. Probably this 
entailed being ended up with violence and because of the bloody repression of the 
demonstrations; the situation became even worse after that…And that at the end 
there was no solution, but they repressed the frustration, and politics came up with 
new lies in addition to old ones.” (S: 5) 
 
“I saw many times, like every teenager in the ‘90s, that gypsy hordes terrorise, beat 









No data available. 
Q4 
How entrenched is the alienation? 
AK 
IK IC 
Few years before the hotspot. (S: 2) 
He had been neo-Nazi since he was 17 (33 at the time of the hotspot). (S: 5) 
Few years before the hotspot. (S: 2) 
Q5 




No data available. 
Polarization Questionnaire – Arpad Kiss, Istvan Kiss and Istvan Csontos 
Q1 











“There was a revolutionary atmosphere at that time. These moments were totally 
uplifting. Its repression (the revolution) however resulted in frustration. Probably this 
entailed being ended up with violence and because of the bloody repression of the 
demonstrations; the situation became even worse after that…And that at the end 
there was no solution, but they repressed the frustration, and politics came up with 




“I knew that they have had issues with Roma…I am not surprised about that though, 
because this is unfortunately the situation in Hungary.” (S: 1) 
 
(Lawyer of the victims: “these four person had a real reason to believe, based on the 
feedbacks from their circle, that the whole country holds the same opinion about the 
Roma, and that they would be thanked for their acts.” 
Q2 









To what extent do the actors’ opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, 





“There was a revolutionary atmosphere at that time.” (S: 5) 
“The communists have always hated me because of my nationalist mentality.” (S: 5) 
Q4 
To what extent do the actors consider the political field to be polarized as compared 





No data available. 
Q5 
Did the actors consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the 







“The communists have always hated me because of my nationalist mentality…after 
2010, when the government has changed, I felt no longer that it was a political show 
trial..” (S: 3) 
 
  
Injustice Questionnaire – Laszlo Toroczkai,  
Q1 
To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice? 
LT “As I promised, those whose name will be remembered both in Hungary and Europe 
as the most disgraceful traitors cannot prevent us from arresting the criminals who 
break in our homeland, cottages and homes by destroying the border fence” + “They 
are coming from a completely different civilisation” (S: 3) (Injustice is unlikely a real 
motive.) 
Q2 To what extent were the actors motivated by a real 
or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads 
to consistently unfair treatment? 




To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution? 
LT Redistribution is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q4 
To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition? 
LT Recognition is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1)  
Q5 
To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation? 
LT Representation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1)  
Grievance Questionnaire – Laszlo Toroczkai 
Q1 
How specific is the experienced grievance? 
LT Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q2 
How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances? 
LT Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q3 
How personal is the grievance? 
LT Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q4 
How formalized is the demand to address the grievance? 
LT Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q5 
How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance? 
LT Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Alienation Questionnaire – Laszlo Toroczkai 
Q1 
How specific and central is the sense of alienation? 
 




How voluntary is the process of alienation? 
LT Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q3 
How complete is the alienation? 
LT Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q4 
How entrenched is the alienation? 
LT Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q5 
How reversible is the sense of alienation? 
LT Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Polarization Questionnaire – Laszlo Toroczkai 
Q1 
To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized? 
LT “As I promised, those whose name will be remembered both in Hungary and Europe 
as the most disgraceful traitors cannot prevent us from arresting the criminals who 
break in our homeland, cottages and homes by destroying the border fence…We 
should be grateful and thankful for them, and not reporting them to the police like 
traitors do. These weaklings, reporting migrant supporters should come and join the 
line, they are useless anyway.” + “war for a multicultural Europe” (S: 5) 
 
Q2 
How high is the perceived level of the polarization?   
LT ““They are coming from a completely different civilisation.” (S: 5) 
Q3 
To what extent do the actors’ opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, 
religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place? 
LT The actors consider themselves to be directly encouraged and are financially 
supported by the government. (S: 1) 
Q4 
To what extent do the actors consider the political field to be polarized as compared 
with the social sphere? 
LT “As I promised, those whose name will be remembered both in Hungary and Europe 
as the most disgraceful traitors cannot prevent us from arresting the criminals who 
break in our homeland, cottages and homes by destroying the border fence…We 
should be grateful and thankful for them, and not reporting them to the police like 
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traitors do. These weaklings, reporting migrant supporters should come and join the 
line, they are useless anyway.” (S: 5) 
Q5 
Did the actors consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the 
institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot? 
LT The actors are represented by the government. (S: 5) 
 
Injustice Questionnaire – Gyorgy Budahazy 
Q1 
To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice? 
GB Injustice is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q2 To what extent were the actors motivated by a real 
or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads 
to consistently unfair treatment? 
GB Injustice is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q3 
To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution? 
GB Injustice is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q4 
To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition? 
GB Injustice is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q5 
To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation? 
GB Injustice is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Grievance Questionnaire – Gyorgy Budahazy 
Q1 
How specific is the experienced grievance? 




How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances? 
GB Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q3 
How personal is the grievance? 
GB Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q4 
How formalized is the demand to address the grievance? 
GB Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q5 
How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance? 
GB Grievance is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Alienation Questionnaire – Gyorgy Budahazy 
Q1 
How specific and central is the sense of alienation? 
 
GB Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q2 
How voluntary is the process of alienation? 
GB Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q3 
How complete is the alienation? 
GB Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q4 
How entrenched is the alienation? 
GB Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
Q5 
How reversible is the sense of alienation? 
GB Alienation is not at all or only a negligible motive. (S:1) 
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Polarization Questionnaire – Gyorgy Budahazy 
Q1 
To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized? 
GB There is a liberal or cultural-Marxist group which has been around on the Globe for 
about 150 years, constantly evolving, whose obsession is to subvert the traditional, 
conservative ideals in the society. Their mission to turn everything upside down. 
Once they did this as Bolshevists, then, after the French Revolution, as Jacobins, 
and today we call them Liberals. But this is a totally militant Liberalism, and the Pride 
is its weapon. This is how I look at it, like a scissors shredding the yet intact fabric of 
the society; it cuts into it while they are pushing it forward. It is so absurd that, if they 
managed to reach their goal, it would enable other things to happen. The most 
threatening issue is not that they get certain people involved in that degenerate 
community, of course it is dangerous too…but they can force the public to remain 
silent and scare them away from raising their voice against it. The public will be 
scared of being labelled, because they (the gay) label very aggressively…and then 
they can do anything they want, not only this, but anything, for example they can 
bring 2 million negros and Arabs to the West, to Germany, who beat up the people, 
rape the women, and the white men are just standing there and staring at it, because 
all has been set, among other things, precisely by this (the Pride). (S: 5) 
Q2 
How high is the perceived level of the polarization?   
GB “First, the organisers of the Pride, and second, those who claim we should just ignore 
them (the gay) because they only ask for recognition…it’s dangerous because what 
they really want is precisely to be ignored so that they can unleash themselves in 
the society, and then, in their own way, with their media, just like in the West, they 
can reach their goals and get into the bloodstream…if we step up against them and 
keep the cordons (the Pride is usually held behind cordons) they cannot get in the 
every-days of the people.” + “Every kind of sexual degeneration / aberration result 
in paedophilia…They (the gay) now want to break in schools and families..they 
published the children’s book “Wonderland Belongs to Everyone” which only serves 
the degenerative brainwashing of children.” 
Q3 
To what extent do the actors’ opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, 
religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place? 
GB The actor’s view is in line with that of the government. (S: 1) 
Q4 
To what extent do the actors consider the political field to be polarized as compared 
with the social sphere? 
GB “There is a liberal or cultural-Marxist group which has been around on the Globe for 
about 150 years, constantly evolving, whose obsession is to subvert the traditional, 
conservative ideals in the society. Their mission to turn everything upside down. 
Once they did this as Bolshevists, then, after the French Revolution, as Jacobins, 
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and today we call them Liberals. But this is a totally militant Liberalism, and the Pride 
is its weapon.” (S: 5) 
Q5 
Did the actors consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the 
institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot? 
GB The actors are represented by the government. (S: 5) 
 
